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Chapter Nine

Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away
A Soldier’s Story
William Ian Miller

Statutes make for appallingly tedious reading unless primitively short and
to the point as, for example, this provision in the early Kentish laws of
Æthelberht (c. ): “He who smashes a chin bone [of another] shall pay
 shillings” or this one from King Alfred (c. ): “If anyone utters a public slander, and it is proved against him, he shall make no lighter amends
than the carving out of his tongue.”1 Yet on very rare occasion a modern
statute can rivet our attention and when it does, it seems to do so by mimicking some of the look and feel of legislation enacted in less lawyer-ridden
times. Consider the statute presently codified in the United States Code as
part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
Misbehavior before the enemy
Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the
enemy—
() runs away;
() shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any command, unit,
place, or military property which it is his duty to defend;
() through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers
the safety of any such command, unit, place, or military property;
() casts away his arms or ammunition;
() is guilty of cowardly conduct;
() quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage;
() causes false alarms in any command, unit, or place under control of
the armed forces;
() willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing,
which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy;
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() does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any troops, combatants, vessels or aircraft of the armed forces . . . when engaged in battle;
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may
direct.2

Making cowardice a capital offense strikes us as a kind of barbaric survival from a rougher age, a time, that is, when few doubted that courage
ranked higher than pity or prudence in the scale of virtues. And if many of
us today believe that capital punishment cannot be justified even for the
sadistic torturer, what a shock to discover that, as an official matter at least,
Congress reserves it for the person who cannot kill at all. Not to worry: although the state has the power and right to execute those who misbehave
before the enemy, we are too unsure of ourselves, or maybe even too charitable, to enforce the statute maximally. We have done so but once since 
when Private Eddie Slovik was executed by firing squad “pour encourager
les autres” in the bleak Hürtigen Forest of .3 Still, even if only by inertia, we have preserved the option.
Quite independent of the grimness of its sanctions, the statute prompts
our attention because of its strangely absurdist quality. Most of its provisions seem merely to restate one another. What, for instance, is running
away () that isn’t also cowardly conduct ()? And aren’t paragraphs  and
, the one covering the shamefulness of cowardice on defense, the other
governing slacking off on offense, really special cases of cowardly conduct
punished in ? Paragraph  goes so far as to make jitteriness a capital offense to the extent one’s nerves lead one to overinterpret causes for alarm,
while paragraph , in contrast, authorizes putting the sleeping sentry before the firing squad apparently because he is not jittery enough even to
stay awake.
There is also the statute’s strange relation with fear. All law must pay
homage to fear, for if the law does not succeed in nurturing the passions
that will make it self-enforcing, such as a sense of duty or a special reverence for the law as law, it must have recourse to fear, the passion that underwrites all coercive law—fear of punishment or the fear of the shame of
being execrated as a lawbreaker. But this statute places fear at its substantive core, for it is fear-impelled action that it mostly seeks to regulate.
Only paragraph —the stricture against looting—cares nothing about
fear, not even the fear that you and your raping and pillaging comrades inspire in the enemies’ civilian population as you quit your proper place to
plunder. Like the other provisions, the antilooting provision is devoted to
maintaining the delicate balance of forces that keep armies behaving as
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armies rather than as crowds. At times that balance is as susceptible to being
undone by routing the enemy as by being routed by him. Success can be as
disordering as failure.4 The initial success of the German offensive on the
western front in  was stopped as much by the German soldiers stumbling upon stores of wine and cognac as by Allied resistance. But the weight
of these strictures shows that loss of discipline and order bred by greed,
cruelty, lust, and other manifestations of exultant riot is of significantly less
concern than the loss of discipline bred by fear, slackness, and failure of
nerve. Narrow self-interest in the exuberantly acquisitive style of the looter
is just not as worrisome to an army as narrow self-interest in the life-preserving style of the coward. Fearfulness, not lust or gluttony, count as a soldier’s first sin.
There lurk in this strange statute various attempts at a theory of the
moral and legal economy of courage, cowardice, duty, and fear in the context of the demands a polity, in this case the American polity, makes upon
its combat soldiers. The exposition that follows, structured mostly as a gloss
on the various provisions of the statute, seeks to reveal the features of that
economy.

Running Away
Isn’t running away, punished in paragraph , running like hell for the rear,
precisely how we quintessentialize cowardice (punished in paragraph ),
just as casting away arms (punished in paragraph ) so you could run away
faster was how Plato and Aristotle quintessentialized it?5 In fact, the very
vividness of the image of running away has led some defendants to prefer
being charged with the vaguer and more abstract cowardice under paragraph , considering it less prejudicial than an accusation of running away.6
But statutory provisions that to the normal eye look duplicative will inspire
interpreters to invent differentiating glosses, just as language itself, though
needing all kinds of structural and particular redundancies, never quite allows a perfect synonym. So paragraph —cowardice—was read to require
a showing of fear as a necessary element of the offense.7 Cowardice had to
be motivated by fear or it was not cowardice, but running away, it was decided, did not need to be so motivated. This strikes normal people, nonlawyers, that is, as somewhat perverse. Why else would anyone flee battle,
run away, if not in panic, terror, or out of simpler fears of death and mayhem?

 w i l l i a m i a n m i l l e r

The military judges are often at a loss to give running away a meaning
that can distinguish it from cowardice. One military court, which then became the final word on the subject, made this desperate attempt:
This term [runs away] must connote some form of fleeing from an ensuing
or impending battle. . . . [I]t appears that to limit the phrase to flight from
fear or cowardice is too restricted. It would appear to be more in keeping
with the offense, if an intent to avoid combat, with its attending hazards and
dangers is considered as an essential part of running away.8

Running away is made a catchall for whatever motives other than fear
might impel turning tail in battle. And what might these motives be? One
could, I suppose, run away out of treachery, or out of love, or out of the
most calculating thin-lipped prudence.9 But the narrative suggested by
each one of these motives seems incomplete without complementing them
with fear. The most psychologically plausible motive for running away that
dispenses with fear is fleeing in disgust, sick at being stuck in a situation
where so much is asked of you and so little given you in return; not fear, but
the feeling of being ripped off, revolted by unfairness and injustice. But one
does not “run away” in this setting; the image is wrong, even the notion of
“fleeing” misrepresents the insolence, even the fearlessness, with which one
walks, sullenly saunters, or shuffles but manifestly does not run away, while
muttering “f-k this.”
But the court doesn’t offer us a picture of sullen withdrawal. Still desperate, it turns to Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, where
Winthrop too evinces bafflement, and in good legal form provides authority for his bafflement by citing an older writer who was discussing something not precisely on point:
RUNNING AWAY. This is merely a form of misbehavior before the enemy,
and the words “runs away” might well be omitted from the Article as surplusage. Barker, an old writer cited by Samuel, says of this offense:—“But
here it is to be noted that of fleeing there be two sorts; the one proceeding of
a sudden and unlooked for terror, which is least blameable; the other is voluntary, and, as it were, a determinate intention to give place unto the
enemy—a fault exceeding foule and not excusable.”10

The court citing Winthrop citing Samuel citing Barker11 hopes for some
clarification in Barker’s distinguishing between two types of fleeing, one in
panic, which is excused as being so suddenly induced as to be largely involuntary,12 whereas running away is calculated treachery, self-serving, and, by
one view, a manifestation of narrowly construed interested prudence.
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Panic, one suspects, is treated more generously because it is impractical to
do otherwise. It usually involves large numbers in headlong flight and however harmful its consequences, it hardly makes sense to hand over the entire army to a firing squad. Barker’s distinction between exceeding foule
voluntary flight and less voluntary panicked flight follows immediately
upon his discussion of Roman decimation. His association of ideas suggests that decimation might be suitable for generalized panic-propelled
fleeing, but that fully individualized punishment, rated at . probability
rather than at the . discounted group rate, be meted out to the voluntary
calculator of his own immediate best interests.
No wonder prudence is such a suspect virtue in the extreme setting of
combat, for in battle the prudence that qualifies as a virtue is not the prudence of each individual figuring out the wisest course for himself to pursue but the prudence of strategy and tactic at the level of the group. And
what is prudence for the group often demands that the individuals that
compose the group forgo more personalized prudence and opt instead for
duty, heroism, honor, and glory, which provide them some kind of moral
compensation for having the misfortune of being sacrificed for the greater
good. Individualized prudence, we suspect, is too easily used to provide a
serviceable gloss for cowardice. Cowardice, however, is not only about
panic and no cases suggest that it is, the use to which Barker was put to
notwithstanding.
A prosecution brought under paragraph , cowardly conduct, must
show, as noted, that the conduct was motivated by fear. This is one of the
few areas in the law where the decision maker is asked actually to find that
the person was motivated by a particular passion, not just to find that the
person was in the sway of some generalized powerful passion. How do we
recognize that another was moved by fear? Do certain bodily clues give him
away? Was he pale, did he tremble, sweat, shed tears, urinate or defecate in
his pants? Few somatic indicators—facial expressions, blanchings, flushings, shakings—are unique to fear. We sweat from heat, shed tears in joy,
grief, and merely from the cold. The most lethal saga hero of ancient Iceland grew pale in anger, not in fear. Montaigne observes that both “extreme
cowardice and extreme bravery disturb the stomach and are laxative. The
nickname ‘The Trembler’ given to King Sancho XII [he means actually his
son Garcia V] of Navarre serves as a reminder that boldness can make your
limbs shake just as much as fear.”13 Dysentery can cause us to befoul ourselves. And the fear of getting caught with one’s pants down often leads the
soldier, at least in the trenches of World War I, to become desperately con-
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stipated.14 Fear does have a distinctive facial expression, but we can be in
fear’s desperate grip without looking like we are. Not only can the expression be suppressed when one is scared, but it can be faked when one is not
scared.
This is not earth-shattering news. State of mind always ends up being inferred either by legal convention or by supplying the social knowledge necessary to make sense of whatever act or omission whose motivation we are
searching for. If he trembles and runs away, or cries while curled up in a
fetal position and hence cannot advance, then we judge that behavior to be
a consequence of fear. And what about the specific feeling that we usually
recognize to be fear? Do all fears have the same feeling? It is not clear that
they do. Can we properly describe someone as motivated by fear if he runs
away from obvious danger as if he were afraid, but who claims to have felt
no inner surge, no grip in the gut, no sensation, that is, that most of us recognize as an accompanier of fear if not fear itself?

Gentle Offense versus Craven Defense
Fear has been read in as an element only in the specific charge of cowardice
in paragraph . But it is also the psychological and social Èminence grise in
other provisions. Paragraph  deals with the shameful abandonment or
surrender of men, a position, or material; paragraph  deals with the willful failure to do one’s utmost to encounter the enemy. Paragraph  can be
seen as the failure to give cause to the enemy to violate their version of paragraph ; that is, the most desired outcome of your aggressive moves is to
cause the enemy to abandon shamefully what is its duty to defend. The
“shamefully” explicitly makes this a moral issue, as well as a legal one. And
that is quite fitting, for the goal of battle, as John Keegan has noted, is to
bring about the moral collapse of your opponent, for battle is in the end always something of a moral contest, a matter of matching how character
confronts demands of duty to perform dangerous action in the face of
overwhelming desires to flee or quit, in the face of the instinct of selfpreservation itself.15
Keegan’s moral contest is bounded so as to make no distinction between
the different moral and psychological claims made on the defender and the
attacker. For him, this contest of character is, with due allowances for heroic
failure, a matter of who, to borrow an image from Anglo-Saxon verse, controls the slaughter-place at the end of the day. Our statute, however, makes
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such a distinction. Paragraph  involves the kind of mettle needed to defend
properly, paragraph  the kind needed to offend or attack. And although we
understand failures under each provision to involve cowardice, it is not
clear that these cowardices carry the same moral weight or are understood
in quite the same way.
Courage on defense seems to demand a different mix of virtues and talents than courage on offense, and it may be that cowardice also varies with
the different styles of courage demanded. We can, I think, imagine someone who is perfectly courageous when attacked, who will not flee, who will
even die before abandoning the fight, who at the same time does not have
the ability to initiate violence, who, if not quite a mass of quivering jelly,
may tend to find too many reasons, with all the trappings of an admirable
prudence, as to why it would not be in anyone’s best interests to go over the
top: a slacker. A person constituted like this would not strike us as a psychological impossibility. In fact U. S. Grant complained that such was exactly the problem with one of his generals—G. K. Warren: Warren was able
to see “every danger at a glance,” too many dangers apparently, and he delayed moving until he had made exacting preparations for each of them
with the result that he never got to his appointed place in time to coordinate with others. But still “there was no officer more capable, nor one more
prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy forced him to it” (emphasis supplied).16 Nor is the obverse unimaginable: someone brave in the attack but cowardly in defense. Some have suggested that this describes Mike
Tyson’s moral failure in his fights with Evander Holyfield, who, when his offensive ominous aggressiveness failed to cow the opponent, either folded
sullenly or folded violently, but in such a way that announced he was quitting the field. Aristotle may have had such a type in mind in his rather implausible portrait of the rash man, who turns cowardly the moment he experiences any real resistance.17
Let me turn now to another matter. Consider this remarkable account
from Abner Small, a Union officer, recalling the battle at Fredericksburg:
I wondered then, and I wonder now equally, at the mystery of bravery. It
seemed to me, as I saw men facing death at Fredericksburg, that they were heroes or cowards in spite of themselves. In the charge I saw one soldier falter
repeatedly, bowing as if before a hurricane. He would gather himself together, gain his place in the ranks, and again drop behind. Once or twice he
fell to his knees, and at last he sank to the ground, still gripping his musket
and bowing his head. I lifted him to his feet and said, “Coward!” It was cruel,
it was wicked; but I failed to notice his almost agonized effort to command
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himself. I repeated the bitter word,“Coward!” His pale, distorted face flamed.
He flung at me, “You lie!” Yet he didn’t move; he couldn’t; his legs would not
obey him. I left him there in the mud. Soon after the battle he came to me
with tears in his eyes and said, “Adjutant, pardon me, I couldn’t go on; but
I’m not a coward.” Pardon him! I asked his forgiveness.18

Grand stuff this: the penitent self-understanding and the moral courage of
the author, an officer, to beg forgiveness of one of his men. In another register this is an account of weak legs and the moral ambiguity of such cases.
The spirit was willing, but the flesh was weak. The soldier’s body just would
not respond to the total dedication of his will to do the right thing, to go
forward. If we decide the legs are blameworthy, but not the will, we, like Mr.
Small, will be inclined to beg pardon of the soldier for calling him “Coward”; if we blame the will for not being able to overcome the fear that has
turned his legs to jelly, then we too might call him “Coward.”
By one account the soldier’s body was completely overborne by fear, but
his own perception was of having all the right feelings, the right motives,
with his fear subdued or overcome if felt at all, only to be betrayed by a body
that was an enemy to his good name, a rebel to his will. If we are likely to see
him as fearful without the consciousness of his own fearfulness, he, instead,
sees himself as fearless with a body mocking him by producing unmotivated
fear symptoms. So he disowns his legs. How, though, are we to understand
his weak legs?19 Without a convincing account of mind and body, emotion
and body, we do not know how to apportion blame as between body and
soul. And we are not confident of how to make the call. Is this a peculiarly
male form of hysteria? Do weak legs support a theory of unconscious emotions, or at least of unconscious fear?20 Or are we talking about a much more
primitive central nervous system ur-emotion? Do we see instead a conscious
refusal of the soldier to recognize his true emotional state, whether we understand the refusal’s mechanism to work by means of classic forms of selfdeception or wishful thinking or by a process more akin to repression? And
how do such tricks of consciousness fit in with William James’s scheme in
which the consciousness of one’s emotional state is the awareness of changes
in one’s somatic state, that is, we are afraid because we tremble and our legs
give way, rather than that we tremble and suffer weak legs because we are
afraid? What if the refusal to admit fear is simply a refusal to take note of our
body at all? Are we then fearing? Or fearing fear? Or simply falling apart at
the seams? But then might not the soldier know he fears but what he means
to indicate is that he does not ratify his fear; he means to move on in spite of
it and is desperately ashamed that an undesired desire for safety is causing
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his body to defeat his desired desire to move forward? He does not, after all,
will the various appraisals and beliefs that constitute fear; he need only look
and listen and know where he is and what he is up to to have a more than
reasonable serious apprehension for his safety.
Mr. Small’s own psychological theory varies with the exigencies of the
setting and no doubt ours would too. In the heat of battle Small was not as
willing to be generously disposed toward the shaken soldier as he was upon
reflection afterward and upon the soldier’s poignant showing of his lack of
shamelessness. Not only does the soldier shed tears of frustration, contrition, and shame, but he also responds to his officer’s accusation as a man of
honor would: he gives Small the lie, exactly the traditional manly challenge
to a duel upon an accusation of cowardice. The poor man means well in the
aftermath and our own and Small’s lack of certainty as to the psychological
and physiological components of weak legs make us incline toward lenity
and thus believe he meant well on the field of battle too. And the statute follows Small and us in a small way.
If cowardice on offense runs into the moral and legal uncertainty of how
to treat a case of weak legs, it at least gives us a hint that it was precisely this
kind of case the statute had in its allegorical mind. Hence the demand of
willful failure, not shameful failure, as in paragraph . The weak-legged attacker is given some small concession. He must will his legs’ weakness to be
culpable and so it seems our soldier may well be spared the firing squad.
Nonetheless, cases of unwilled weak legs might still be shameful, as indeed
our soldier desperately feared. Shame, unlike guilt, is felt not only for our
voluntary failures but for what we happen to be, as the infirm, ugly, old,
black, Jew, or weak-legged soldier can often attest. If he just can’t help his
weak legs, he may still be in the martial world a coward, but in the more nuanced judgment of one Civil War soldier, “a good coward,” one at least who
showed up for every battle and looked for no excuses to absent himself
from it ahead of time.21
Cowardice on defense seems more craven than cowardice on offense. Our
image is of begging not to be killed, turning tail and running, or simply despairing and not just not fighting, as on offense, but not fighting back. Failure under each provision, paragraph  or , is cowardly, and hence shameful, but only one offender, the miscreant defender, is branded shameful. Why
the difference? There are several possible reasons. One involves the different
stakes between losing as a defender and not measuring up as an aggressor.
In the paradigm case we understand that the failure to defend means losing
all; whereas the weakness on offense means you go home with your tail be-
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tween your legs. But there is a home to return to. We are all expected to defend what is ours, our property and our loved ones. Consider too the almost
ridiculous obviousness of this statement: the moral demand to defend to the
utmost is greater than the moral demand to attack or aggress to the utmost.
Even in aggressive honor-based cultures that is true. However fearful you
are, you must defend, but no one expects everyone to volunteer to be the forlorn hope, the first through the breach in the wall. And as a psychological
matter, we tend to find losses of what is already ours much more grievous
than failures to acquire an equivalent amount of what is not ours.
The defender doesn’t have the same kinds of choices the aggressor has or
as many, for the latter is the moving party. It is aggressors who get to choose
the timing, and even to determine that the battle will be on your turf rather
than mine. The defender has no choice but to resist, even though he has some
choices about how to carry this out: sometimes he must fight pitched battles,
but other options are available, as long as they are understood to be forms of
resistance. The Russians, for instance, have let the vastness of their land defeat its invaders until it was safe to assume an offensive posture; others have
worn their attackers down with pesky gnatlike resistance, as Fabius did to
Hannibal. But we should also note that Fabius had to muster great reserves
of moral courage to persevere in the face of being thought cowardly by his
countrymen for not engaging more aggressively.22 Gnatlike resistance,
though effective in the end, may in certain warrior cultures not look “manly”
enough to preempt accusations of poltroonery. The prudent warrior must always endure suspect glances and innuendoes about his fearfulness and lack
of nerve. The statute may capture some little bit of that mistrust of the good
faith of justifications for retreat and surrender, holding the defender of
hearth and home to a higher moral standard than the weak-legged attacker.
The paradigm we see embedded in the statute—of invading aggressor versus
the defenders of the homeland—grants the attacker other options; it even allows him to plead weak legs from time to time, but the defenders’ legs must
stand firm. And maybe too we seem to feel that we have more right to ask legs
to stand still than to move forward, by which ruse we simply restate the differing moral stakes in not defending as opposed to not offending.

Throwing Away One’s Weapons
The prescription against casting aside one’s arms has a rich and long tradition. It is a triumph of a certain dunderheaded literalism that often charac-
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terizes law and the legal imagination that this provision, paragraph ,
wouldn’t be understood to be implicit in paragraphs  (running away), 
(shameful abandonment of a position), or  (cowardice), but especially .
Running away, except as perversely understood by the military courts, and
casting away one’s weapons, as I noted earlier, are both meant to capture the
quintessence of martial cowardice: headlong panicked, sauve-qui-peut
flight:
Well, what if some barbaric Thracian glories
in the perfect shield I left under a bush?
I was sorry to leave it—but I saved my skin.
Does it matter? O hell, I’ll buy a better one.23

The comic energy of Archilochus’s little song is parasitical on the power of
the norms he so gleefully confesses to violating. The wit of such self-mockery, at such brazen shamelessness, is possible only because the norm against
running away and debarrassing oneself of one’s burdensome weapons demands some kind of psychic homage even when not adhered to.24 But there
is another kind of heroic inversion that takes place here. To be this cheerfully a coward in a warrior culture may itself mimic courage: such unapologetic shamelessness requires a certain kind of fearlessness, as Aristotle recognized.25 This is the fearlessness that informs what we might vulgarly call the “I-don’t-give-a-shit-what-they-think” attitude in matters
touching upon reputation, an attitude as unfathomable to most of us as is
the berserk courage of the kind that we associate with Alexander the Great.
In keeping with his perversely inverted courage Archilochus refuses even to
allege fear as the reason for casting away his weapons. It is all a matter of rational choice. His weapons, as he observes, are completely replaceable,
something that he is quite pleased to believe is not the case with himself.
And although Archilochus knows he will have to fight again (that is one of
the risks that running away does not completely resolve unless he is capitally punished for it), there is not the least hint he will do better next time.
Archilochus’s wit also reveals that virtue funds a powerful comedic impulse dedicated to deflating virtue’s own pretentiousness and goody-twoshoes piety. Archilochus’s comedy celebrates a life-affirming world of very
unrigorous virtue, what somber professors of virtue might even call vice.
Life-affirming affability, as unrigorous a virtue as we might find, is not a
trait we think of as likely to describe the hero as it does the amiable hedonist, who means well and even does well as long as life or limb are not at
stake, who prefers to keep fear safely relegated to worries about whether the
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sauce is sufficiently piquant to satisfy his guest’s palate. Yet unlike the other
cardinal and theological virtues, courage thrives in certain restricted
comedic veins. It is not just the butt of the comedic; in some cultural settings the heroic style means to be funny with the nasty in-your-face mordancy of gallows humor. Here the mockery is not directed against the
virtue of courage at all but against all arguments that would undermine it,
such as life itself.
With Archilochus compare the keen comedic eye of this Confederate
soldier running away to beat hell at Sharpsburg:
Oh, how I ran! Or tried to run through the high corn, for my heavy belt and
cartridge box and musket kept me back to half my speed. I was afraid of
being struck in the back, and I frequently turned half around in running, so
as to avoid if possible so disgraceful a wound. It never entered my head to
throw away gun or cartridge box; but, encumbered as I was, I endeavored to
keep pace with my captain, who with his long legs and unencumbered would
in a little while have far outstripped me but that he frequently turned towards the enemy, and, running backwards, managed not to come out ahead
in this our anything but creditable race.26

John Dooley, our soldier, runs his anything but creditable race desperately aware of the comedy of trying to maintain the appearance of honor in
headlong retreat: don’t get shot in the back if you can help it and don’t
throw away your arms, although you realize that they have less than zero
value to you now, pure dead weight. Dooley is a wit after a fashion. He is
not unaware of a kind of double competition with his captain, one to see
who can get away the fastest and the other to see who can get away the slowest. He envies his captain’s benefits of rank: no pack, they are in a wagon
somewhere, and no rifle. By this time the weapons of officers are becoming
symbolic indicia of rank, like the pistols, whistles, and walking stick of the
British officers who led their men into no-man’s-land in the Great War. The
ambivalence in the account and in the action itself gives the comedy multiple layers.
The heroic ideal of standing your ground at all costs turns out to give
way before fear and not an altogether irrational fear, though as in
Archilochus the fear is not mentioned directly but supplied by the comic
action. Both John Dooley and his captain are still giving respect to the
norms they are not quite living up to by adhering to some of their forms:
John will not throw away his gun or ammunition, though he is sorely
tempted, and both he and his captain engage in the comedy of trying to
prevent the ignominy of being shot in the back by running backwards every
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now and then. Comedy, we see, can be called to the rescue of heroic, even if
it must mock it rather roundly while saving appearances.
It is the comic voice with its almost self-delighting self-mockery that indicates this is not culpable cowardice. The comedy is probably the surest
sign that Dooley and Archilochus are not alone in flight. The whole army is
in what might be generously called a retreat, a rather indecorous one at
that. This is a pure case of running away to live to fight another day as long,
that is, as they do not throw their weapons away. Dooley’s attempts to
maintain the forms of honor indicate quite well that he means to be back.
Even Archilochus means to return with his new shield, but by throwing his
old one away he committed an offense that Dooley may have wanted to
commit, but his implicit contest with his captain to see who could minimize their mutual dishonor kept him honest. Archilochus, however, does
more than just disarm himself, he arms the opposition.
From the military’s point of view casting aside arms is a very serious
matter. It renders the soldier useless; it arms the opposition, and in societies
in which the work and material that was congealed into the weapon represented the most valuable objects in the culture, throwing away weapons was
culpable waste, even sacrilege. But nonmilitary moralists take a kindlier
view: Aquinas was willing to find the soldier who cast away his shield less
sinful than the licentious man, because “grave fear and sorrow especially in
dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the
motive of intemperance.”27 But Thomas might also be underestimating the
deliberative capacity of the weapon dropper. Dooley deliberately refrained
from casting his aside; others might deliberately do so, for they might reason that an unarmed man might look like a noncombatant and thus fade
by degrees into a general population.28

False Alarms
Paragraph  punishes capitally the person who causes false alarms and it
must be seen as the companion of paragraph , which punishes the person
who “through disobedience [or] neglect endangers the safety of command,
unit, [or] place.” One provision sets limits on jitteriness, the hyperalertness
and excessive imagination that if not quite inventing danger overrates its
imminence; the other seeks to limit the lack of jitteriness, the lack of imagination or insensibility that lets the sentry fall asleep on his watch. Falling
asleep on the watch is a strict liability offense. It does not matter that you
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didn’t mean to. And the same is the case for causing false alarms. There are
no requirements in the provision that one causes them knowingly or intentionally, and no cases have read them in.29 It is not only the prankster
who set off the fire alarms in junior high (though he too) that the law can
put before the firing squad but the nervous wreck, the poor, high-strung,
anxious soul who suffers from being too alert to the prospect of danger and
has not managed to develop the cool or the expertise that distinguishes between the general danger of being in the presence of the enemy from the
particular imminent danger that requires immediate and total mobilization. This poor soul does not feel the difference between the state of daily
alertness to the possibility of alarm on the one hand and being alarmed on
the other, between normal vigilance and the sense that something indeed is
up. For we suspect that this is an imaginative soul and much too sensitive.
Risk to him is not a probabilistic assessment but certain danger. His lot is
constant insomnia and nausea.
My false alarmist, however, may also be the very man who is asleep at his
post. Given that for him there is no distinguishing between the various levels of danger or its imminence, sleep, never easy to achieve under the best
of circumstances, might just as well come at one anxiety-ridden time as another.30 But we usually think of the sleeping sentry as utterly opposed to the
false alarmist, as a study in insensibility, an anxietyless person for whom
sleep has always been easy. And it is for this reason alone that he is simultaneously an object of the nervous insomniac’s envy and his contempt.
The sleeping sentry and false alarmist contrast in other ways. As a purely
Darwinian matter, the species needs an alarm system that engenders some
false positives or it wouldn’t be sensitive enough. A system that gave no false
positives would have left us all in the viscera of our predators or slaves of
our more sensitive enemies. But an alarm system too responsive would, as
Goffman noted, have us spending all our time in dither and not in grazing,
digesting, sleeping, playing, or whatever we need to do to survive.31 This is
why we divide the labor; the sentry is to be vigilant so that the rest can sleep.
We want our sentry to be experienced and cool but not insensitive or dull.
We need him alert or, if not alert, alertable by all those signs that, if we lived
in a movie, would be accompanied by ominous music.
The false alarmist and sleeping sentry impose costs in different ways. The
false alarmist runs up the bill each time he occasions a false alarm. To the obvious costs of wasted energy spent mobilizing, the physiological costs of
misused adrenaline, mis-summoned fear, and loss of sleep should be added
the disclosure of one’s positions to the enemy by the mobilization or merely
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by the panicked firing into the threatening night. But the greatest cost is that
false alarms lead to mistrusting the next true alarm. And although we may
recoup some of these costs by the disbelief of future false alarms, that would
be a penny-wise and pound-foolish accounting, for the alarm would not be
disbelieved because false but disbelieved because of the belief that all alarms
are more likely to be false than true. Such a belief leaves one effectively without a functioning alarm system. The jittery false alarmist, after all, does not
mean to be false and in other settings his sensitivity may be a most valuable
asset. True, its value suffers serious diminution if he is not right most of the
time. And if he were right most of the time, we would consider him a man
of experience and discernment, not a jittery pathetic wreck whom we can
imagine putting up before the firing squad.
If the false alarmist imposes serious costs each time he blows it, that is
not the case with the sleeping sentry. His sleep imposes harm if the attack
occurs on his watch, otherwise his sleep, though negligent or even reckless,
yields no great harm. But not quite. If others suspect he is asleep, or know
he is asleep then they must increase their vigilance to compensate. Their
anxiety levels rise and they begin to expend energy in dither that could have
better been spent relaxing. The sentry functions in the way catastrophe insurance functions. Most days go by without our having gained much for
carrying such insurance except the ease of mind having it confers. The sentry provides such insurance. He is meant to allow others to rest secure in
the belief that his eyes and ears are just as serviceable at the moment as
theirs would be.
To the extent that insensibility produces fearlessness, it may be very useful in the midst of combat either on attack or in defense. But in the myriad
of soldiers’ memoirs I have been plowing through fear is not the only psychically and morally destructive emotion that threatens soldierliness. Fear
dominates in battle or in immediate anticipation of it, but soldiers do more
than fight. They also stand and wait. Boredom defeats almost as many soldiers as fear. If fear defeats our false alarmist, boredom defeats our sleeping
sentry, so bored he cannot generate the imagination to fear the consequences of his boredom.

Omnipotent Fear
The man of reasonable firmness who gives way to his fear has the basis for
a successful claim of duress in the criminal law, but in the military the
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man of reasonable firmness can never give into his fear unless a substantial number of others give in at the same time. If he is the only one or one
of few who give way, we judge him to be of insufficient firmness. In cases
of common duress the defendant is measured against a norm whose constraint on actual behavior can be hypothesized only by figuring what that
hardly heroic “reasonable man” would do under like circumstances. But
in war the norm is situated concretely: we know whether most hold firm
or most don’t. If most don’t hold firm, they are all pretty much off the
hook, for we do not, in the Roman style, cast lots and decimate the battalion.32
No one, however, doubts that soldiers are afraid.33 There have been
through time different views as to whether it was acceptable for them to
admit openly that they were, but fear was clearly always a gloomy and
tormenting omnipresence. Those few who qualify as genuine berserks
aside, the dominant passion in battle, the one each party expects its comrades and its opponents to be intimately involved with, is fear. We might
see all heroic literature as a desperate attempt to keep it at bay. One pays
homage to it by working hard to deny it in oneself and to insult one’s opponent with it. Agamemnon has images of Terror and Panic painted on
the sides of his shield.34 Before the battle of Gaugamala, Alexander sacrificed to Fear. Beowulf drinks and boasts the night before seeking out
Grendel to raise the moral stakes of failure. Even Achilles, if not quite
fearful, doesn’t dare fight without armor as some of the Norse berserks
would do. And Alexander again, who was surely a berserk in combat and
feared no one in the host arrayed opposite him, nor the whole host for
that matter, was still rather paranoid at times about suspected plots
against his life from within his own ranks. (There is an interesting idea to
pursue here: the different issues raised for the demands on our courage
by our fear of enemies as opposed to our fear of friends. And this would
hardly be solved by the fiat of declaring that our friends are those whom
we do not fear.)
Commanders have always assumed the fearfulness of their soldiers. The
subtlest observer of all, Thucydides, noticed the tendency of battle lines to
extend by degrees to the right so that each army slowly flanked its opponent’s left as it too moved to its right:
This is because fear makes every man want to do his best to find protection
for his unarmed side in the shield of the man next to him on the right, thinking that the more closely shields are locked together, the safer he will be.35
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Exhortation speeches try to counter fear and reluctance with other pasions: revenge, perhaps, anger, confidence, bloodlust, and often, in extremis, desperation. But no commander trusted to mere words. The Persians whipped their men to battle; many a general used his cavalry to deter
his fleeing troops more than to engage the enemy. One military theoretician, Raimondo Montecuccoli, a general on the Imperial side in the Thirty
Years War, spent the bulk of his treatise on how to prevent the natural cowardice of one’s own troops from taking hold to give enough time for the
natural cowardice of the troops on the other side to assert itself. He lists
some of the devices one may use to keep one’s men on the field: let the
enemy cut off lines of retreat, forbid the inhabitants of nearby friendly
cities from admitting any of the troops, dig trenches behind your troops,
burn bridges and ships, delegate certain men to shoot retreating soldiers.36
When arraying the troops and forming their lines, Raimondo advises embedding the cowards in the middle of the ranks behind the valorous ones
whom they can follow at less risk to themselves and hemmed in by the
ranks behind them so that their escape routes are clogged.37
One can also combat fear by instilling confidence, he notes. Nor does it
matter that that confidence is ultimately indistinguishable from those crude
self-deceptions that actually on occasion do succeed in bootstrapping us
into performing better than we have any right to expect. “One may conceal
or change the name of the enemy general if he happens to have a great reputation.” Confidence can also be acquired by the indirection of stimulating
contempt for the enemy by presenting naked prisoners to the soldier. Once
they have viewed the captives’ fragile, flabby, filthy, diseased, and infirm legs,
as well as their hardly valiant arms, then men will have no reason to be
afraid, for they will have had the chance to see the kind of people with whom
they must fight—namely, pusillanimous, humble, and tearful individuals.38
While cowards like me and a good portion of my readers may find in this
display additional reason to desert or flee rather than fight to the death,
Raimondo thinks otherwise:
Indeed, the troops may come to fear the state of bondage themselves once
they have perceived the wretched fate of such afflicted, shackled, castigated,
and emaciated persons, and they may conclude that it will be better to fall in
battle rather than, dragging on their lives unhappily, necessarily experience
such contumely and calamity.39

Our statute joins Raimondo in adding to these in terrorem motivational
exercises. As we have seen, the statute authorizes the killing of cowards,
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slackers, craven defenders, jittery false alarmists, and supposes to dissuade
behaviors such as theirs by taking from them exactly what they sought to
save: their lives. The statute testifies to the power of fear as a motivator:
make them fear the court-martial as much as they fear the enemy. This is
probably not the wisest strategy since it gives the soldier no reason, once the
crunch is on, to prefer one outcome to the other; and it loses all its force
should he fear the enemy more. Moreover, it is not uncommon that the
coward in battle faces the firing squad with dignity and courage. Such was
the case with Eddie Slovik, who spent his last moments trying to alleviate
the anxiety of those who had to execute him. The fear that motivates cowardice may not just be the fear of death but the inability to suffer Death’s
malicious teasing. Certain death, whether by suicide or firing squad, may be
a kind of relief, a good-bye to all that.
The statute also hints of another motivating fear; it is the fear of being
disgraced as a coward, the fear of shame. This is hardly a startling revelation. It is a commonplace, the theme of honor itself, which demands that
fear of losing on esteem and esteemability is worse than death. In this light
the law can be seen not only as the scourge of those too shameless to be
properly motivated by their sense of shame but also as a bit player in backing the norms that support the sense of shame. The law, then, though
mostly negative in its means of motivating, also has a positive role to play
in securing the behavior it desires.
To conclude, reconsider the statute. One may wonder at the impossible
standard it sets. The soldier is to do his duty, but the duty demanded seems
almost to be beyond the call of duty. It is as if the law asks not only that soldiers not be cowards but that they be courageous as a matter of routine. But
then consider briefly paragraph , the one provision we have left unnoticed
until now. It governs, among other things, the obligation to rescue. In contrast to the heroic demands of the other provisions not to run, not to fail
willfully to advance, not to abandon shamefully a position, we move to the
world of purest prudence: not to “afford all practicable relief.” When it
comes to rescuing your fellows, practicality and rationality are the standard, not courage, unless it be as Aquinas and others have argued, that
courage is just the virtue reason and practicality need to keep functioning
in fearful circumstances. Of course, it doesn’t make sense to throw good
bodies after bad unless it is rational to do so, that is, unless the likelihood of
saving the endangered one is greater than the danger incurred by the rescuer to save him.
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Yet it is precisely in the domain of rescue that twentieth-century battle
has made its particular addition to the styles of the heroic. It is in the Great
War that stretcher bearers get Victoria Crosses, and in Vietnam that medics
get their Medals of Honor. In the Civil War the same medal was more likely
to be awarded for rescuing the regiment’s colors.40 Is it that the antiglory,
antihonor discourse has finally become sufficiently suspect that we prefer
the heroism manifested in the greater love that lays down or risks its life for
another as against those acts in which we suspect that the motive may be
glory itself? Heroic culture would consider glory and honor as fine a motive as there could be; we mistrust it precisely because it seems, in spite of
its frequent rashness and irrationality, self-regarding and even self-interested, even though it must risk self-sacrifice. By setting our heroic stories in
narratives of rescue are we arguing for a kinder-styled heroic: selfless, fearless, and life-saving rather than life-destroying?41 How do we fit this in with
the suspicion that we may be as self-regarding now as ever it was possible
to be? Or is it that we see the medic, the stretcher bearer as needing no special physical attributes, that they indeed are everyman or indeed everywoman, that they hold for all of us the possibility of grand action, even if
we do not have the body of Ajax or the spirit of Alexander or the ability to
kill other human beings even when it is in our best interests to do so?42
But for most of us I would guess that what is most salient in this statute
is not its substantive commitments so much as its formal attributes. For
surely the statute’s most remarkable feature is its redundancy, which in a
statute that seeks to punish capitally becomes a redundancy of both literal
and figurative overkill. Yes, the statute excuses cases of weak legs as long as
the mind did not willfully collude with the body to produce them and puts
no extraordinary demands on the rescuer, but it otherwise is quite clear
about reserving the firing squad for cowardice motivated by fear, and if that
lets too many off the hook of culpability, it specifically includes the jittery
alarmist, the person who turns tail for whatever motivation other than fear,
the slack attacker, the person who casts away his weapons, the quiveringly
craven defender, and the exuberant looter.
The statute received its present form in  when it was cobbled together
from the Articles of War and the Articles for the Governance of the Navy
into a Uniform Code of Military Justice. Most of the clauses were already extant in the British Articles of War of , which in turn were enacted virtually verbatim as the American Articles of War of . In them are found the
strictures against looting, shameful abandonment of a position, casting
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away arms, and causing false alarms, but not the clauses against cowardice
and failure to engage, that is, the weak-legs provision. Those have their origin in the navy articles.43 It is not, then, until  when all these clauses were
tossed together that military judges felt called upon to distinguish between
cowardice and running away and we get, as a result, our explicit jurisprudence of fear; cowardice is motivated by fear and nothing else.
But this does raise one final matter for weak legs. Weak legs turn out to
be a certain kind of sea legs. Not that the army couldn’t always get the weaklegged advancer under various general orders,44 but the navy was concerned less with the legs of its sailors, at least until they might have to board
the enemy ship, than with the will of a captain to make his ship advance.
The sailors could be standing on the deck with legs quivering and still be
advancing because they were being borne by a higher will, willy-nilly. The
provision that I have been dealing with as a weak-leg provision is historically not about legs at all but about a naval captain’s weakness of will.
And one final observation about cobbling, statutory revision, and uniformity in this world of uniforms: it was the modern reform, the modern
consolidation of the articles providing a uniform law for all the armed services that produced the archaic, casuistic, ad-hoc absurdist look of the present statute, not the remnants of pre-eighteenth-century diction still lingering about in shameful abandonments and the casting away of arms. It
was the  consolidators, that is the modernizers, who made this statute
look more like a law of Æthelberht or Alfred than a law of the most advanced industrial power of the  world.
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